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DELEUZE, SPINOZA AND PSYCHOLOGY 
NOTES TOWARDS AN ‘EXPERIENCE ECOLOGY’ 
Steven D. Brown﹡ 
The Open University, U.K. 
Introduction 
The work of Gilles Deleuze has much to offer contemporary thinking in psychology. As 
the papers in this volume show, the restructuring of what are usually taken as ‘topics’ 
for psychological analysis into genuine ontological and epistemological concerns leads 
to a profound questioning of how we think about the nature of ‘the psychological’ and 
the ways it can be studied. As Paul Stenner and I claimed in Psychology Without 
Foundations, the encounter with Deleuze does not so much provide a new grounding 
for the discipline, but instead calls into question the very idea of premising psychology 
on a clearly defined notion of ‘substance’, whether it be mind, body, brain, society, 
conversation or some judiciously defined amalgam of terms. The psychological is 
everywhere – in the sense that we cannot extract if from the myriad processes through 
which it is continuously enacted – and nowhere in particular, because it is not a ‘thing’ 
that has a simple location in some place or other.  
Placing the psychological within the philosophical tradition of ‘process thinking’, via 
Deleuze, is initially destabilising. It invites the immediate retort that, if psychology 
cannot adequately define its subject matter in advance, then it surely has little right to 
make a legitimate claim to be a discipline, particularly at a time when neuroscience and 
behavioural economics are gnawing away at both ends of the intellectual terrain. But 
breaking up established thinking is just one part of the Deleuzian project; it is always 
accompanied by the positing of a new set of concepts and enquiries. In a quasi-
dialectical fashion, deterritorialization cannot be separated from reterritorialization (see 
Williams, 2013). To that end, there is an equivalent task of developing and honing a 
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different series of ‘images of the psychological’ and corresponding conceptual 
vocabulary that runs alongside the Deleuzian critique of extant psychology.  
In this paper, I want to offer the example of ‘ecological psychology’ as one area where 
the dynamic of critique and reconceptualization through Deleuze can be considered. 
Here using the proper name ‘Deleuze’ is somewhat misleading since, as I hope to show, 
what is named is a point of intersection between a philosophical body of work and other 
intellectual currents, coming from practices as diverse as anthropology, biology and 
theatre. My argument is that as psychologists we are mistaken to imagine that Deleuze 
can provide us with the philosophical resources that we need to think through our own 
disciplinary problems. To do so is to both underestimate the complex relationship that 
Deleuze has to the canon of philosophy, along with the highly specific nature of 
‘philosophical problems’, and to the more general problem of the relationship between 
practices that Deleuze and Guattari open up in What is Philosophy? (1994) What is 
needed instead is to recognise that Deleuze serves as both irritant and catalyst to 
psychological enquiry.  
Deleuze as philosopher and nonphilosopher 
Throughout his life, a considerable proportion of Deleuze’s writing consisted of his 
unique exegesis of other philosophers, most notably Bergson, Nietzsche, Leibniz, Hume 
and Spinoza. Whilst his engagement with Bergson effectively bookended his work, 
forming the basis for some of his earliest essays (see Deleuze 2004) and the crucial 
theme of the virtual and the actual, developed best in Cinema 1 (1986) and Cinema 2 
(1989), and which he was still picking over in Immanence: A life (2001), published 
months before his death. But in purely quantitative terms, Deleuze spent more time 
writing directly on Spinoza than on any other philosopher. Spinoza was the subject of 
Deleuze’s secondary doctoral thesis in 1968 (1992), and the ‘Christ of Philosophers’ 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1994: 60) became a repeated point of reference thereafter until 
the very end – ‘The transcendental field thus becomes a genuine plane of immanence, 
reintroducing Spinozism into the most elemental operation of philosophy’ (Deleuze, 
2006: 386).  
Spinoza occupies a curious position in the history of philosophy. Born a generation later 
than Descartes) and dying roughly a century before Kant’s revolutionary Critique of Pure 
Reason, Spinoza stands between what would usually be considered as the birth of 
modern philosophy and the Western Enlightenment. In this sense, Spinoza’s work points 
both backwards, in its concerns with establishing ontological principles, and forwards in 
its desire to mobilise philosophy as a challenge to a politics of domination and alienation. 
Deleuze often conflates these aspects of Spinoza, in part by arguing that in Ethics, 
Spinoza deliberately constructed a text operating at multiple levels: 
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This is the style at work in Spinoza’s seemingly calm Latin. He sets 
three languages resonating in his outwardly dormant language, a 
triple straining. The Ethics is a book of concepts (the second kind of 
knowledge), but of affects (the first kind) and percepts (the third 
kind) too. Thus the paradox in Spinoza is that he’s the most 
philosophical of philosophers, the purest in some sense, but also 
the one who more than any other addresses nonphilosophers and 
calls forth the most intense nonphilosophical understanding. This is 
why absolutely anyone can read Spinoza, and be very moved, or see 
things quite differently afterward, even if they can hardly 
understand Spinoza’s concepts. Conversely, a historian of 
philosophy who understands only Spinoza’s concepts doesn’t fully 
understand him. (Deleuze, 1990a: 165-6) 
I would venture that we are meant to grasp the fairly direct implication here that 
Deleuze is also describing his own philosophical aspirations. He is a philosopher who 
addresses nonphilosophers, and hence one whose work cannot be fully grasped as 
situated within the history of philosophy itself. But the converse is also true. There is 
much in Deleuze’s work that we nonphilosophers – by which I mean, those whose 
vocation lies outside the formal practice and institutions of philosophy – can ‘hardly 
understand’, since honing the purity of philosophical thinking is simply not our concern. 
This means that there are vast swathes of both Deleuze and Spinoza (and Deleuze on 
Spinoza) that appear to pass us by. For example, much of Expressionism in Philosophy: 
Spinoza is taken up with considering the significance of Spinoza’s substitution of the 
term ‘expression’, which Deleuze treats as something akin to ‘emergence’ or 
‘supervenience’, for the medieval term ‘emanation’, which could be thought of as 
resembling ‘transmission’. The philosophical problem at stake here is fundamental. 
Cartesian dualism divides mind from body, but reunites them in relation to a third 
‘master’ position – God – which is the formal, emanative basis on which the whole 
dualistic basis of personhood is constructed. Whatever we are is first in God. Spinoza, 
by contrast, sees bodies and ideas as dual aspects of a singular substance, which is 
famously referred to in Ethics as ‘God; or nature’. This holistic, all-encompassing 
substance is constantly modifying itself but, crucially, each modification is a 
development or emergent property of substance, such that whilst every being may be 
said to be ‘within’ God/Nature, they are irreducible to some pre-existing design or form. 
The significance of this is to replace the idea of a transcendent world of ideas, which 
stands above and beyond yet drives all human experience, with the idea of immanence 
and self-creation (or autopoiesis), where potentiality is already contained within the 
world itself. Put slightly differently, novelty and difference is a creative process 
undergone by the world with neither transcendent direction nor prior blueprint (see 
Bruun Jensen, this volume). 
As the refusal to posit a conceptual or spiritual realm lying beyond the world of potential 
lived experience, immanence is a rich philosophical concept. It is also notoriously 
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difficult to develop adequately. Whitehead ([1929]1978), for example, had recourse to 
a doctrine of ‘eternal objects’ and thought is necessary to find a place for God within his 
process metaphysics (see Stengers, 2011), whilst Deleuze ultimately turned to Bergson’s 
notion of ‘virtuality’ as a means of resolving how a world can become other to itself 
when it has no outside. But what then is the psychological significance of immanence? 
Whilst psychology still struggles to fully wrest itself of dualism, it does not typically rely 
upon the idea of transcendence, with the possible exception of poorly executed use of 
genetics of evolutionary adaptation as explanatory ‘grand narratives’. We can articulate 
the problem better by turning it towards ecological psychology. 
Person-environment relationships 
Harry Heft’s (2001) detailed account of the lineage that runs from William James’ radical 
empiricism to JJ Gibson’s (1979) Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, by way of EB 
Holt, provides a compelling argument for seeing ecological psychology as an 
operationalization of the concept of immanence. James famously argued for ‘pure 
experience’ as a metaphysical starting point (James, 1906), an undivided flow of 
potential experiences that are immanent to the relations we have to the world. As Heft 
shows, James is not denying the existence of a material world, but rather proposing that 
the ‘conceptual orders’ through which we come to know the world, and thus have 
specific, discrete experiences, are extracted from the world itself. The dynamic lived 
relation between knower and known is primary and contains ‘more’ in terms of ‘latent 
structures’ of knowledge than are expressed by any particular given experience (see 
Heft, 2001: 54-57).  
Translating this into psychological terms, we might say that as persons, we are already 
embedded in relationships with the world around us that dispose us towards particular 
kinds of experiences. Describing these person-environment relationships adequately 
then becomes the primary task of psychological analysis. Ecological psychology, in its 
various forms, offers a series of approaches towards such description. Kurt Lewin (1936), 
for example, develops ‘life space’ as a means of conceptualising the field of possible 
actions in which the person is situated. Gibson (1979) focuses on the perceptual 
relationship between the person and the affordances – or ‘behavioural invitations’ – of 
the environment. In both cases, there is a kind selectivity at work. We do not necessarily 
act upon, nor perhaps even grasp the range of potential actions that are available to us. 
The most basic psychological operation is that of reducing or cutting out the pathways 
to actions we wish to accomplish from the myriad others to which we are immediately 
disposed. In this way, we can see that a fundamental error in modern psychology has 
been to over-invest in the idea of representation – that mental processes ‘add’ to the 
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world rather than ‘subtract’ or ‘extract’ from a field of possibilities (a point already 
discussed at length by Bergson in 1908 in Matter and Memory).  
But in making this claim, it can seem that we tacked too far back in the direction of a 
form of empiricism which sees the ideational as constituted out of elementary building 
blocks of perception. Gregory Bateson (1973) provides the modern form of Humean 
empiricism in his description of mind as the distributed system of organising ‘differences 
which make a difference’ (i.e. information). Although Bateson is working in a cybernetic 
framework that we would now call ‘open systems’, and with a notion of information that 
is far more dynamic than that which would be adopted in the standard model of 
cognition (see Nichterlein, 2013), this kind of approach does seem at odds with an 
elaborated theory of meaning, such as that associated with phenomenology. The 
solution proposed by Heft (2001) is to see ‘effort towards meaning’ as being a 
distinctively human activity that is enacted through symbolic elaboration of person-
environment relations. This arises from the relative complexity of the human organism 
in comparison with other forms of organic life. So whilst meaning is latent within 
‘conceptual orders’ grounded in the world, it remains the preserve of the human to 
accomplish this kind of semiosis. 
This kind of operationalization of immanence in psychology then seems to arrive back 
at privileging of the human subject, and a return to something like symbolic 
representation as the principal conceptual tool to understand what makes us persons. 
Spinoza and Deleuze would then be something of a detour that brings psychology back 
to where it started, but with perhaps an increased awareness of the material grounding 
of psychological operations. At this point it is worth returning to a crucial, and oft-cited, 
aspect of Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza as an ethologist. 
The worlds of animals and humans 
As a kind of addendum to the publication of his secondary thesis, Deleuze (1988) 
published a short work on Spinoza, which elaborates on key terms from Ethics. In a brief 
final section of the book, Deleuze reflects on the then contemporary significance of 
Spinoza’s philosophy. In Ethics, Spinoza describes how ‘bodies’ and ‘ideas’ are two 
attributes of a single substance. The attributes are divided into ‘modes’, which 
corresponds to the elements of the world of experience. Deleuze offers the term ‘plane 
of immanence’ in place of substance, and then proceeds to draw out the implications of 
seeing ideas and bodies as two aspects of the same field – every body has its conceptual 
dimension, just as every idea has a material existence. The ordering of bodies in relation 
to one another is simultaneously the ordering of ideas. Thinking is not some abstract 
activity, but a physical encounter with the world (see Brown & Stenner, 2001). Spinoza 
grounds his theory of knowing on this intimacy of the physical and the ideational. 
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Embodied encounters that increase the organism’s powers to act and to feel are, at the 
same time, experienced as an expansion in the capacity for thought. If, for Descartes, 
the route to adequate knowledge was through reduction to the cogito, for Spinoza it is, 
by contrast, expanded out into our worldly encounter. We think as we feel. Thinking is 
part of an affective field. 
Spinoza’s elaboration of this theory of knowing involves more subtlety and ethical 
nuance than can be described briefly (see instead Negri, 1991; 2013). What is relevant 
here is that Deleuze focuses on the term affect to describe both the capacity of the body 
for entering into relations with others and the transformations brought about in the 
body as consequence of such encounters. An organism can, Deleuze claims, be described 
in terms of its affective capacity. He then goes on to argue that this renders Spinoza as 
a forerunner to modern ethology: 
Every reader of Spinoza knows that for him bodies and minds are 
not substances or subject, but modes. For, concretely, a mode is a 
complex relation of speed and slowness, in the body but also in 
thought, and it is a capacity for affecting of being affected, 
pertaining to the body or to thought. Concretely, if you define 
bodies and thoughts as capacities for affecting and being affected, 
many things change. You will define an animal, or a human being, 
not by its form, its organs and its functions, and not as a subject 
either; you will define it by the affects of which it is capable. 
Affective capacity, with a maximum threshold and minimal 
threshold, is a constant notion in Spinoza … Long after Spinoza, 
biologists and naturalists will try to describe animal worlds defined 
by affects and capacities for affecting and being affected. For 
example, Jakob von Uexküll will do this for the tick, an animal that 
sucks the blood of mammals. He will define this animal by three 
affects: the first has to do with light (climb to the top of a branch); 
the second is olfactive (let yourself fall onto the mammal that 
passes beneath the branch); and the third is thermal (seek the area 
without fur, the warmest spot). A world with only three affects, in 
the midst of all that goes on in the immense forest. (Deleuze, 1988: 
124-125) 
Deleuze recruits the work of Jakob von Uexküll, the Estonian biologist, as exemplification 
of how Spinozist thinking is retained in modern approaches to studying the 
environmental contexts of organic life. von Uexküll ([1934]2010) developed the notion 
of ‘umwelt’ to describe the perceptual world of an organism, such as a tick. The world 
of every organism depends on the reciprocal relationship between its sensory capacities 
and the affordances of the environment in which they dwell. So whilst many different 
species might co-exist in the same physical location, following von Uexküll, we may treat 
each species as having its own radically specific umwelt. As a consequence, we may see 
psychology as the study of the ‘human umwelt’ – on which see Shotter & Newson (1982). 
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It is at this point that we have to confront a major issue in Deleuze’s scholarship. When 
reflecting on his own intellectual practice, Deleuze, in no unproblematic terms, 
described his reading of philosophical texts as producing ‘monstrous’ readings that, 
whilst faithful to the letter of the text, deliberately transformed the work into something 
other (see Deleuze, 1990a: 6). But it is notably that nowhere in his writing (so far as I am 
aware) does Deleuze reflect in a similar way on his practice with regard to the 
nonphilosophical work he engages with. Like many of his contemporaries, Deleuze was 
concerned with literary and artistic practices, albeit at the ‘high’ rather than ‘popular’ 
end of culture. And in doing so, it has been repeatedly observed that rather than bring 
philosophical analysis to bear upon the practice in question in a crude explanatory 
fashion, he treats the engagement as an opportunity to ‘do philosophy’ through a 
different medium. However, this means that Deleuze is often very selective in what he 
takes as relevant. For example, whilst the Cinema books demonstrate Deleuze’s 
sustained and passionate knowledge of film and film-making, he has very little to say 
about the place of sound and music in the cinematic experience (see Warde-Brown, 
2017). When it comes to his use of non-philosophical material from other disciplines, 
this selectivity is greatly increased. As Bruun Jensen & Rödje (2009)   describe, Deleuze’s 
use of anthropological material, especially in A Thousand Plateaus, demonstrates a very 
limited grasp of the history and concerns of that discipline, to the point of bringing into 
question the legitimacy of the use of the examples themselves. This is particularly acute 
in the case of those disciplines that fall between the cracks of the triumvirate of 
philosophy, art and science, which Deleuze & Guattari (1994) proclaim as having 
responsibility for generating knowledge of concepts, affects and percepts respectively, 
leaving little room for the social sciences (see Brown and Stenner, 2009). 
Perhaps there is something of a quid pro quo here. If we are allowed not to ‘get’ the 
more narrowly philosophical side of Deleuze, then we must similarly forego his selective 
interest in other disciplines. But, as the use of von Uexküll above demonstrates, it is 
important to not to lose sight of the creativity of Deleuzian exegesis. von Uexküll does 
not treat the world of the tick as composed of three affects. Instead, he regards the tick’s 
umwelt as defined by three ‘marks’ or signs formed by odor, temperature and the 
hairiness of other animals. Marks/signs serve as ‘carriers of meaning’, and, as such, are 
crucial to the way the organism navigates its umwelt. For von Uexküll, ‘anything and 
everything that comes under the spell of an environment is either re-directed or re-
formed until it becomes a useful carrier of meaning or it is completely neglected’ (2010: 
144). By this, he means that selected qualities of a thing or an organism are transformed 
into ‘perception marks’ that are meaningful within the umwelt. But these marks have a 
relationship to what von Uexküll calls ‘effect marks’. For example, a rock lying on a path 
can appear as an obstacle, but picked up and thrown at a menacing dog, it signification 
becomes that of defence or weapon. The elements of an umwelt are then continuously 
being shaped by their signification as perception and effect marks. 
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These semiotic aspects of von Uexküll are selectively avoided in Deleuze’s 
interpretation, despite these being of central significance for interpreters of his work as 
varied as Thomas Sebeok (2001) and Jaan Vaalsiner (Vaalsiner & Gertz, 2007).   Deleuze 
is, of course, highly versed in semiotics, as his reading of Proust (2000) demonstrates. 
But the lack of a discussion of signs in one of the most well cited of Deleuze’s illustrations 
of affect creates some difficulties. It overshadows the careful separation of concepts, 
percepts and affects that is already present in other aspects of Deleuze’s reading of 
Spinoza, and which becomes decisive in later works such as What is Philosophy? Affect 
can then appear to be something of a universal medium in which more precise 
psychological questions about the structuring of experience become washed out. In 
particular, the duality of ideas/affects and minds/bodies that is at the heart of Spinoza’s 
metaphysics becomes rather lost. This means in turn that in order to get a theory of 
meaning out of this work, we may be tempted to return to a position close to that of 
Heft in arguing the human umwelt consists of not only infinitely more affective 
dimension, but also in a unique capacity for symbolisation. To avoid this we will have to 
dig a little harder into Deleuze’s interpretation of Spinoza and add in some other 
supporting work. 
 
‘A tree of will which walks will return’ 
Any theory of meaning involves discussion of one or more of three related domains: 
language or conceptual system (meaning relative to a set of propositions), an actual 
state of affairs (meaning relative to a referent) and subjectivity (meaning for someone). 
Whilst it seems obvious that a coherent theory of meaning ought to encompass all these 
domains, the endless paradoxes that result from such attempts have given rise to many 
of schisms in modern philosophy, not least the analytic/continental division. In 
particular, following Frege, the referential aspect of meaning (i.e. the relationship 
between a proposition and its supposed referent) does not appear to serve as an 
adequate anchor, since propositions change their meaning considerably whilst 
remaining attached to the same referent, and may even refer to non-existent objects. 
This results in a distinction between the sense of a proposition – the thought that the 
proposition expresses – and reference, as the object to which a proposition is about. We 
might think of ‘sense’ as a kind of ideational tissue that spans the various domains of 
language, world and subjectivity, without being reducible to any one.  
In The Logic of Sense (1990b), Deleuze explores the structure of sense through 
considering its paradoxical relationship to non-sense (specifically, the writings of Lewis 
Carroll and Antonin Artaud). For Deleuze, sense is an ‘event’ that emerges between 
propositions, the states of affairs to which they refer, and the subject who is discursively 
situated by what the proposition expresses. Sense is an ‘incorporeal event’ that is 
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extracted from states of affairs, but which, nevertheless, cannot be rendered distinct 
from them. For example, the sense of the proposition ‘the time she scared away the 
vicious dog’ is neither located in the language naming the event, nor in the physical acts 
to which it is attributed, nor for that matter ‘within’ any subject who might articulate 
that proposition. Sense is something else, a kind of relation that inheres across 
description, act and person. It is both of the world, and a transformation of that world. 
To return to von Uexküll, we might say that in acting upon a mark/sign, a sense is 
expressed that cannot be localised to either the umwelt, the conceptual schemas 
through which it is understood, nor to organism who engages with mark/sign. 
To gain a better grasp of what sense might mean in this context, it is worth turning 
towards Antonin Artaud (for a more detailed account see Brown & Stenner, 2009: 86-
108). In a varied and uneven career spanning the first half of the twentieth century, the 
French cultural provocateur Artaud turned his hand to film acting, poetry, theatrical 
production, literature, magic, painting, ‘performance art’ and radio plays. The arc of this 
work could perhaps be summed up best as the attempt to destroy the referential 
function of language in order to push towards an encounter with ‘pure sense’. His work 
starts with reasonably conventional poetry and ends with performances marked with 
atonal music and language transformed into howls. But throughout Artaud returns to 
the same problem – what is expressed by language eludes the meaning of the 
proposition. For Artaud, the search for sense requires the recognition that language 
itself is a kind of ‘body’. Thus dissecting language in the pursuit of sense becomes, at a 
certain point, indistinguishable from a work performed on one’s own body, which is in 
turn part of undoing one’s self. The problem, as Artaud sees it, is that language, bodies 
and selves secrete forms of order within themselves – which Artaud refers to as ‘organs’ 
– that sterilise and domesticate the experience of sense. Pure sense would then be to 
arrive at experience where distinctions are no longer operative – words strike the ear as 
bodies, subjects are no different to walking trees of will, the body is an expression of life 
that can feel and connect beyond the narrowness of ‘being human’. The phrase that 
Artaud uses for this desired experience of pure sense is ‘body without organs’ (Artaud, 
1995: 307). 
The body without organs, as pure sense, is of a piece with James’ notion of pure 
experience. It is the mixing of thought, world and person that serves as the matrix for 
particular kinds of experience. The psychological significance of this concept is that it 
denotes a field that includes but also extends way beyond immediate person-
environment relations, but which is nevertheless essential to grasping the nature of 
those relationships. Lewin (1997), for example, came to recognise that life space could 
not adequately described, in either discursive or mathematical terms, without positing 
how it opened out onto a broader field of non-psychological forces (which he 
confusingly termed the ‘psychological field’) which shaped life space. For example, in his 
wartime work on food choices, Lewin insisted that it was not possible to explain why 
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persons would be prepared to eat particular foods without detailing the broader social, 
industrial, economic and agricultural forces that resulted in the person being confronted 
with particular kind of choices (see Lewin, 1997). Whilst Lewin went further perhaps 
than any psychologist has to date in making these forces part of a psychological 
vocabulary, he ultimately held back from recognising that these were not separate 
fields, but rather a single plane of experience composed of entangled relations. 
Acknowledging the immanence of the ‘psychological field’ (i.e. broader social forces) to 
life space makes it possible to renew Lewin’s vision for a psychology that overcomes the 
dualism of person and environment. 
With regard to ecological psychology, the equivalent move is to recognise that the 
umwelt which an organism experiences has a relational composition that extends way 
beyond immediate perceptual, conceptual and affective experience. For example, the 
world of von Uexküll’s ticks is shaped by deforestation to increase grazing space for 
cattle, as part of the global drive for profit maximisation in the agribusiness. And our 
human umwelt is simultaneously being reshaped by the increasing efficacy of bacterial 
life that is directly related to failure of existing antiobiotics due to their over-use in this 
same industry to accelerate the breeding period of cattle and fowl from birth to knife. 
These broader forces are not external to the psychological. We cannot begin to describe 
particular experiences without situating them in relation to this extended field that lends 
sense to experience without need for neither bounded subjectivity nor clear referent.  
It is here that Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza has its greatest value. Following Massumi 
(2002), we are used to treating the term affect as a way into experience that bypasses 
semiotics. In doing so, affect is typically used to refer to embodied entanglements that 
exceed subjectivity and the overcoding effects of signification. But in Spinoza affect and 
meaning stand in equivalent relation to one another. If meaning is what emerges from 
the ordering of ideas, then affect plays a similar role in relation to the ordering of bodies. 
Our semiotic and embodied life is lived across these dual registers (or ‘attributes’ for 
Spinoza). Neither Spinoza nor Deleuze is offering affect up as the ‘royal road’ to grasping 
experience as non-subjective and a-signifying. What they are pointing to instead is a 
philosophical and, to some extent, practical epistemic strategy. If the ordering of bodies 
and ideas are grounded in a singular substance, then our efforts to create ‘efficacious’ 
order in one register should be automatically reflected in the other. However, as Spinoza 
shows in his critique of Descartes, establishing what counts as ‘adequacy’ with regard to 
ideas alone – the epistemic strategy which dominates western philosophy – is fraught 
with technical problems. By contrast, affect, as the increase or diminishment in our 
power to act, provides a golden thread by which we can begin to order and expand 
experience through experimenting with relational encounters. An increase in our 
affective capacities, is, for Spinoza, both ‘joyful’, and, simultaneously, an extension in 
the ‘adequacy’ of our ideas. When Spinoza declares that ‘no one has yet determined 
what the body can do’, this is not a rallying call to abandon meaning, but rather a 
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strategic choice to use affect as the medium through which to expand and enrich our 
knowledge of the world. Knowing what the body can do is the route to better knowing, 
and, ultimately, the kind of grounded wisdom or ‘blessedness’ that Spinoza see as 
coming from recognising the world’s immanence to our own being. 
The implication of all this for ecological psychology, and for psychology more generally, 
is with the doubling of the affective and the semiotic. Rather than treat these as distinct 
domains of experience, the challenge is to see how fluctuations in our affective 
capacities ‘show up’ simultaneously as emergent orders of meaning. In doing so, we may 
follow the strategy of Spinoza and Deleuze in attending to embodied encounters, not in 
the effort to overcome meaning, but precisely in order to grasp its emergence. And, 
crucially, we need also to orient towards the third term – ‘sense’ – as the means of 
thinking the duality of affect and meaning. Bodies and ideas are not united in a subject, 
but instead in the emergence of an incorporeal event that is expressed simultaneously 
in both an affective and a semiotic register. Sense and sense-making is often treated as 
the outcome of individual or collective efforts to make order out of the disorderly – the 
‘aha!’ moment of sudden realisation and clarity. Yet we may think of it, on the contrary, 
not as something added to the world, but rather as the ‘actualisation’ or ‘concrescence’ 
of a specific experience that is already of the world, albeit as a ‘potential’ or ‘virtual’ set 
of relations. 
Experience ecology 
I want to conclude by discussing a concept that articulates some of the issues we have 
worked through in the operationalization of Deleuze and Spinoza in psychology. Over 
the past ten years, I have worked on a number of studies with Paula Reavey and other 
collaborators which have explored the lived experience of mental health service users 
who are detained within medium-secure psychiatric care (see Brown & Reavey, 2015). 
One of the issues we have encountered is that during the course of detention, service 
users develop ways of relating to self that transform their past experience. We have 
seen this most markedly around sexuality and personal relationships. Service users 
report that they come to view their sexuality as displaced or ‘amputated’ during their 
passage through the secure care system (Brown et al, 2014). This arises through their 
exposure to discourses of ‘risk’ that dominate secure care. The expression of sexual 
desires is prohibited in secure care, and, to compound matters, service users are 
routinely directed to self-police their own sexual desires, which are seen as ‘unhealthy’. 
This has clear implications for their longer term journey towards recovery, especially in 
cases where service users are detained during early adulthood, with the result that they 
resume their life within the community having missed out on a crucial period in their 
development of their capacity to form intimate relationships with others. This is 
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especially problematic given that it is well established that the capacity to form 
meaningful intimate relationships is associated with recovery from episodes of poor 
mental health (see Cromby et al, 2013). 
We have evidence that the kinds of ways that service users come to understand their 
own sexuality and sexual agency during detention persist when they return to care in 
the community. The experiences that occur during detention structure how service 
users think and feel about themselves when they leave secure care. To put this in the 
terms described previously, the shift from one umwelt to another seems to involve 
carrying across a learned embodied relationship to oneself that goes beyond a shift in 
discursive or semiotic frameworks. It is simultaneously a different ordering in embodied 
relationships and in the capacity to feel in specific ways. Here ideas and bodies really do 
seem to be two aspects of the same thing. A service user may no longer be formally 
considered to be a threat to themselves or to others, but the idea of that threat ‘inheres’ 
in a very intimate way in how they feel about their life and their desires.  
The historian of medicine, Edward Shorter (1992), once offered the idea of a ‘symptom 
pool’ to describe the way that psychosomatic symptoms appeared at particular 
historical moments. For example, hysterical paralysis dominated the way the persons 
expressed non-organically derived distress at the turn of the 19th and 20th century, 
whereas debilitating fatigue is now the primary symptom reported by persons who have 
not (yet) received a diagnosis of physical illness. Shorter suggests that there are discrete 
number of ways of experiencing oneself at any given time and place. We want to build 
on this to say that this holds for forms of experience more generally. How we feel and 
relate to ourselves is embedded in a field of possible experiences that has a specific 
sociocultural determination. Events of sense are expressed with particular intensity in 
specific places and times, in the way that Deleuze and Guattari (1988), following Bateson 
(1973), suggest. In this way, the human umwelt is not a given, but is rather a shifting 
field of experience that is both radically specific – in that our capacity to feel in particular 
ways about ourselves is related to the practices in which we participate – and 
generalised in ways that are difficult to map – for example, through the transmission of 
sentiments and bodily practices across diverse media.  
We have developed the concept of ‘experience ecology’ as a way of indexing particular 
kinds of experience to the domains in which they are cultivated and expressed. Risk, for 
example, is a complicated discourse with its own history, but which is made relevant in 
complicated ways in secure settings. Risk is not just a way of making meaning out of the 
immediate environment, it is also inscribed into social space in the form of signs/marks 
that act to shape actions, such as in the design of furniture, walls and doors. As such, 
risk is also felt as much as it is understood, since it inheres in the way that relations 
between bodies are organised. The ‘sense’ of risk then inheres across discourses and 
bodies and gives rise to certain kinds of subjectivities, but it emerges from the broader 
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field or experience ecology. This ecology stretches way beyond any given hospital or 
other given social space. In the same way that Lewin insisted that understanding food 
choice needed to map the relationships between agriculture, markets and homes, so 
the experience ecology of risk needs to attend to complex relationships between 
medicine, law, social welfare, communities and housing.  
But there is something more within the ecology. It is here that Deleuze’s notion of ‘plane 
of immanence’, James’ ‘pure experience’, Bateson’s ‘plateau’ and Artaud’s ‘body 
without organs’ converge. The field of forces out of which particular experiences are 
actualised also goes beyond any particular experience. It opens up onto experiences that 
are as-yet-un-actualised, experiences that are currently ‘impossible’, in the sense that 
they are not part of the grammar of self-relations that are pointed out by signs within 
the experience ecology, but which nevertheless are beginning to emerge, or at least 
becoming imaginable. There are experiences of voice hearing, for example, that involve 
novel relationships between hearer and heard, speaker and what is spoken, that depart 
from current understandings of mental health and bring with them new understandings 
of sensory experiences that are not shared by other people. As psychologists, our role is 
to act as cartographers of extant experience ecologies, but we also have a responsibility 
towards engaging with the emergence  of the un-thought, the experiences-to-come, 
towards life in the making. 
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